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threats. In this article, we present a survey experiment designed to evaluate how information about
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itary action in the context of the ongoing territorial dispute changes with varying information on the
military costs of conflict and its economic consequences. We find that information about trade ties
and military capacity exerts a pacifying effect and strengthens opposition to military action. Con-
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Introduction
There is an extensive literature on the so-called rally effect in public support for international mili-
tary action. The core idea is that an imminent crisis or threats by a rival state will make individuals more
likely to support hawkish leaders and their national security policies. A number of studies have examined
how information about threats can increase the magnitude of the rally effect. Beyond threats, individual
support is also likely to depend on awareness of the potential costs associated with such hawkish poli-
cies and the consequences of possible militarized conflicts. Yet, there has been little research so far on how
awareness of costs affects support for belligerent actions in international crises. In this study, we argue that
gaining information about bilateral relations can change individual awareness about the potential costs of
militarized conflict and induce greater opposition. We take advantage of an ongoing conflict to consider
a situation with external threats, and test the implication that greater awareness of the potential costs
of military conflict increases opposition to military action in an experimental setting. The experimen-
tal results lend support for our argument that despite the existence of ongoing external threats, greater
awareness of the costs influences individual attitudes toward military action and can increase support for
peaceful solutions to international rivalries.
We conduct a survey experiment in Japan, based on a scenario with belligerent action in the highly
salient territorial conflict with China, where we assess how different conditions for the costs of conflict
influence individual support or opposition to hawkish foreign policies. To our knowledge, this is the first
experimental study on individual support for the use of force to consider both military and economic
costs, as well as the specific manner in which information is conveyed. The results indicate that awareness
of military and economic costs is associated with greater opposition to military action. We also find that
awareness of military costs seem to have a larger effect on attitudes than emphasizing the costs of trade
disruption, suggesting that despite the presence of external threats, providing information about costly
military conflict can increase support for peaceful solutions even in ongoing territorial rivalries. Finally,
we find that highlighting information about costs and increasing awareness can strengthen opposition to
military conflict. This provides additional support for our proposed mechanism.
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In the remainder of this article, we first discuss how external threats affect public opinion. We then
introduce our novel theoretical argument that the effect of threats also depends on individual awareness
about the potential costs of military action. We next turn to how the specific manner used to present in-
formation can affect individual awareness of costs, highlighting the likely effectiveness of graphical images
over verbal descriptions. Lastly, we detail our experimental design and findings from the survey exper-
iment in Japan on individual support for hawkish policies within the context of the territorial dispute
with China.
Argument: The Costs of Conflict and Support for Military Action
Research on public opinion and conflict consistently finds that the public is more supportive of mil-
itary action when faced with plausible external military threats. A number of mechanisms have been
put forward to explain this so-called rally-round-the-flag effect. Some argue that individuals generally
become more likely to support political leaders during international crises, as conflict with an out-group
tends to strengthen in-group solidarity and decrease the salience of divergent opinions and preferences
within groups relative to a pre-crisis situation (Mueller 1970).1 Relatively more secure popular support
during a crisis increases the likelihood that leaders will respond to threats with military action (Colaresi
2004, Vasquez 2009). Since disputes in general trigger nationalism, and in particular in territorial disputes
(Fravel 2005, Gibler 2012, Tanaka 2016, Tir 2010), leaders may face costs for not threatening to resort to
military action or being seen as overly dovish, while others argue that leaders have personal incentives
to adopt more hawkish foreign policies during crises in order to try to increase their support or divert
attention from other issues (Tir 2010).2
Existing research has focused on a number of factors that make support for military action more likely
1There are strong grounds to suspect that support is conditional on the magnitude and plausibility of the external threats
(Lai and Reiter 2005). In the context of more “domestic” security threats, Getmansky and Zeitzoff (2014) find that Israeli
voters become more likely to support hardline parties on the right when the range of missiles launched by Palestinian groups
extends so that individuals are at risk of becoming a victim in their locale.
2Given their high salience, territorial disputes may create more opportunities for elites to mobilize the public. The degree
of mobilization is also dependent on the narratives elites use – see Zellman (2015) for experimental findings.
2
in the presence of external threats. Many have studied the role of the domestic media in whether threats
translate to support or not (e.g., Baker and Oneal 2001, Baum 2002, Groeling and Baum 2008). However,
there has been little attention so far to whether the likely costs of conflict can affect the extent of popular
support for military action, even in the presence of plausible external threats. In this article, we argue that
support for military action via such plausible threats can be dampened when individuals become aware
of the costs associated with military action.
Our research is timely as our study case, Japan, is currently facing missile threats from North Korea.
If we only consider the conventional wisdom on the effect of threats, we should expect that Japanese cit-
izens should be more willing to support military action — and possibly pre-emptive action — against
North Korea. By contrast, we argue that once we factor in if people perceive the costs of military action
to be high, they will be less likely to support such measures. Although it is intrinsically difficult to dis-
entangle the effect of perceived costs from external threats, experimental settings allow us to isolate the
effect of former. We explain our experimental design in more detail below, but in the next section, we
first elaborate our argument and consider two specific costs of war, namely the likely negative economic
and military consequences of conflict.
Economic and Military Consequences of Conflict
We have a great deal of existing evidence suggesting that greater trade interdependence can reduce the
likelihood of military conflict. A number of comparative studies show that greater interdependence and
economic ties between states appear to have a pacifying effect on the risk of military conflict between states
due to the expected economic opportunity costs of military action (Gartzke and Li 2003, Mansfield and
Pollins 2001; 2003, Oneal et al. 1996, Oneal and Russett 1997, Rosecrance 1986, Russett and Oneal 2001,
Rummel 1983; 1985, Schneider and Gleditsch 2013, Xiang, Xu and Keteku 2007). Although some studies
cast doubt on the relative importance of interdependence against other liberal factors such as democracy
(e.g., Dafoe 2011), more recently, Tanaka, Tago and Gleditsch (2017) provide experimental evidence that
citizens become less likely to support military action when they are provided with information about
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trade interdependence, consistent with the idea that the likely economic consequences of conflict can
decrease individual support for the use of violence.
However, the total costs of military conflict go beyond the economic opportunity cost. We argue
that the degree of arming and plausible risk of extended military conflict should have similar pacifying
effects on individual public opinion. Most existing work on arming have focused on the incentives of
leaders to arm in the presence of perceived threats from other states and the desire to deter the opponent
from aggression (Jervis 1978, Rider, Findley and Diehl 2011). However, arming is itself costly, and the con-
sequences are ambiguous; deterrence may fail, and arms races may increase the risks of military conflict
(Gibler, Rider and Hutchison 2005, Maoz 1990, Rider 2009). Accordingly, if individuals are sensitive
to the potential risk of conflict and more risk averse than leaders, they should be less likely to support
belligerent policies that risk escalation and arms races, and when the potential costs of conflict are high
(Levy 1992; 1997, de Heus, Hoogervorst and van Dijk 2010). This is especially the case as ordinary citizens
are likely to incur a disproportionate share of the war-related costs compared to elites (Reiter and Till-
man 2002). For instance, militarized conflicts may result in direct costs such as displacement, casualties,
and infrastructure damage, as well as indirect costs such as higher taxes.3 Thus, we should expect that
greater information about higher arming will make individuals more likely to oppose belligerent poli-
cies as they are concerned about the risk of possible militarized confrontation and its costs. Our primary
interest in this article is to demonstrate that two types of perceived costs of conflicts – loss of trade and
costs of arming – both decrease the support among respondents for the government’s belligerent action.
However, because arming can potentially be more destructive and lead to higher costs of conflict than
trade disruption,4 we expect that the pacifying effect of arming will be higher than the impact of trade
disruption.
Our argument also has implications for the literature on public opinion and international conflict.
Leaders may have incentives to respond to external threats with military action during crises (Colaresi
3Flores-Mac´ıas and Kreps (forthcoming) provide experimental evidence indicating that citizens are less likely to support
military interventions if the government pays for them through taxation rather than borrowing.
4Also, all else equal, arming raises the baseline costs of conflict, while trade disruption does not have the feature – a conflict
leads to a loss of the current level of economic activities.
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2004, Vasquez 2009), but threats can have the opposite effect if individuals also perceive higher war-
related costs. Our argument suggests that even if leaders themselves are not deterred by external threats,
we can have more significant public opposition to aggressive policies if there is widespread awareness of
the potential costs of these policies.5 Both economic opportunity costs and military-arming costs can only
influence military action through public opinion if individuals are aware of the likely costs.
Information, Images, and Attitudes
We have so far argued that awareness of potential costs of military action will make individuals more
likely to oppose the government’s military action. The main assumption here is that public opposition
to military action by the government requires that individuals are aware of the costs. It is thus natural to
believe that the way the information is provided matters for the extent to which people are aware of the
potential costs of military action, thereby affecting the degree of opposition to military action. Scholars
have discussed how the use of information can moderate hawkish public attitudes in international crises
(Levendusky and Horowitz 2012, Quek and Johnston 2018). Our study also contributes to existing re-
search through highlighting how the degree of awareness also affects the effect of information on public
opinion.
Even if our argument is plausible and internally consistent in the sense that it would hold in a popula-
tion of rational and informed actors, there are several challenges for the mechanisms to operate for actual
individuals in real life settings. For example, many people with limited interests in politics may not know
much factual information regarding trade and arming, and hence have little basis for assessing the poten-
tial costs of military action. Additionally, individuals may find it difficult to link information on trade and
arming to the potential costs of military action. Humans also have limited cognitive abilities, and often
find it difficult to understand or process information about complex issues (e.g., Berinsky 2007). Baker
5This is reminiscent of the focus on the costs of conflict and the likelihood of successful military action in research on the
democratic peace — wars against democracies are costly because they are better equipped in terms of resources and have elec-
toral incentives to fight harder (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith 1999), and individuals may be aware of
the costs (Tomz and Weeks 2013). Our empirical application considers opinion in a democracy on relations with an autocracy,
and are hence unlikely to reflect different behavior towards other democracies.
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and Oneal (2001) also argue that how information is presented by media and politicians strongly influ-
ence public support for military action (see also Aday 2010). Thus, the specific way information about
the likely economic and military costs of conflict is presented should affect the degree of support for bel-
ligerent military action during crises through its effect on people’s awareness of trade, arming, and the
potential costs of military action. In particular, we expect that presentations that more effectively convey
costs are likely to reduce support for belligerent actions among individual respondents. We believe this
test provides additional evidence for our main claim that greater awareness of higher trade and arming
and potential costs of military action make individuals more likely to oppose belligerent policies.
Here, we take advantage of recent findings that graphical images can convey information more ef-
fectively than just text-based presentations (Nyhan and Reifler 2016, Piston 2014), and examine whether
greater awareness about the costs of military action through graphical images can decrease support for the
military action. More generally, a growing body of research finds that visual images can affect people’s at-
titudes (Mayer 2009, Moreno and Mayer 2002, Piston 2014), including attitudes toward high stake issues
such as national security (Aday 2010, Caverley and Krupnikov 2015, Gartner 2011, Glazier and Boydstun
2013).6 For example, Caverley and Krupnikov (2015) provide experimental evidence that pictures of sol-
diers increase people’s support for increasing military expenditure. Similarly, Hassin et al. (2007) find that
providing Israeli subjects with an image of the Israeli flag influences their political attitudes and induces
them to take a more centrist positions on controversial issues. Gartner (2011) also finds that images of
losing a battle affects the likelihood that people shift from supporting to opposing a conflict.7
We also use graphical images in our tests how awareness of military costs affect individuals’ degree of
support for military action. We expect that graphical images will increase the level of opposition to mil-
itary action more effectively than text alone.8 According to Nyhan and Reifler (2016), graphical images
can convey a large amount of information in a clear way so that citizens can better understand otherwise
6Information is usually processed through two separate channels in the human brain, namely auditory and visual modes
(Moreno and Mayer 2002, Paivio 1986). Because humans can only process a limited amount of information in one channel at
a time, engaging both of these channels facilitate information processing.
7Gartner (2011) argues that visual presentations that have clear and familiar signals are more likely to facilitate an interpre-
tation of information.
8There could be limits to such effects. For example, Valentino, Hutchings and White (2002) point out that presentations
that are too explicit about sensitive topics such as race in the US are unlikely to elicit truthful answers.
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more complex and difficult information. In addition, graphical images are considered to be more effec-
tive in conveying trends or changes in quantities over time (Nyhan and Reifler 2016, Piston 2014).9 These
studies suggest that graphical presentations combined with texts can increase people’s awareness of accu-
rate information of interest.10 From this, we argue that adding a visual presentation with a graph should
increase the impact of information about the likely costs of militarized conflicts on support for military
action.
In sum, our expectations can be summarized as the following hypotheses:
H0: Greater awareness of the likely costs of conflict decreases individual support for hawkish action by the
government toward a rival country.
H1: Providing information about costs of arming decreases individual support for hawkish action more
than about opportunity costs of trade.
H2: Providing information about costs in a graph decreases individual support for hawkish action more
than in a text description alone.
Tanaka, Tago and Gleditsch (2017) have already demonstrated plausible support in favor of H0, and
our analysis is not designed to test this. Rather, we use H0 as a baseline assumption, and then focus on
testing what kind of information could lead to a decline in support for the government’s hawkish action
through raising awareness of the likely costs (i.e., H1 and H2). More specifically, we test the hypotheses by
using a survey experiment in the context of the enduring rivalry and territorial disputes between Japan
and China over the disputed islands Senkaku/Diaoyu. This is an appropriate test case since there is a clear
9More specifically, Nyhan and Reifler (2016) find that graphical presentations of information can correct people’s mis-
perceptions, and Piston (2014) demonstrates that individual’s ignorance can be mitigated by providing visual images, thereby
affecting political decisions.
10This does not exclude other ways of increasing public awareness of costs of military action such as pictures, but we believe
that a graphical presentation is the best way to estimate the perceived costs, while controlling for other factors in the treatment
presentation.
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rivalry and plausible threat of military action between the two countries, but many individuals may be
relatively ignorant of the likely costs of conflict.
Japan’s recent defense white paper makes it clear that the Japanese government still views China as a mil-
itary threat, referring “to Beijing’s heavy-handed eorts to increase its military presence in the East China
Sea and South China Sea” (Asahi Shinbun, August 2, 2016). China immediately responded with strong
condemnation and reiterated their claim to the disputed islands (Washington Post, August 3, 2016). De-
spite recent development on North Korea’s missile crises, several expert interviews suest that the Japanese
continue to consider China as the primary threat (Reuters, March 20, 2018).
It is also clear that Japanese public opinion has been generally very negative toward China, in particu-
lar since Japan’s “nationalization” of the uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (Iida, Kohno and Sakaiya
2012). The Chinese public has also expressed negative attitudes toward Japan, including many anti-Japanese
demonstrations following the announcement of the “nationalization.” This antagonistic sentiment should
suffice to create a baseline rally eect among Japanese public. Tanaka, Tago and Gleditsch (2017) demon-
strate that Japanese public opinion toward China is indeed generally very hostile, and that respondents are
generally likely to support belligerent actions by the government on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.
An experiment is useful to test our argument. Randomly providing information that primes association
between military action and costs allows us to isolate the eect of perceived costs on individual support for the
use of force, holding other factors such as external threats constant or independent of the treatment. In the
next section, we present our experimental design for examining whether providing relational information
can mitigate the baseline hawkish attitudes.
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Empirical Analysis
Survey Design
To test the hypotheses, we designed an original survey experiment and conducted it in Japan with a
sample of 1,461 Japanese adults in July 2015.11 The sample was drawn by a Japanese survey firm, Nikkei
Research, from their opt-in online panel.12 This is a non-probability sample, but we attempted to sample
based on three key demographic variables (i.e., age, gender, and residential locations) to ensure that the
sample would resemble as closely as possible the general population.
We provided all respondents with a hypothetical scenario with a belligerent act by the Japanese govern-
ment in the ongoing territorial disputes between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and
asked respondents whether they would support or oppose it. More specifically, respondents were told that
“Today, the Japanese government decided to station SDF (Self-Defense Forces) destroyers on the Senkaku
islands.”13 They were then asked “Do you approve of the Japanese government’s decision?” on a 5-point
scale: 5 (strongly agree), 4 (somewhat agree), 3 (neither), 2 (somewhat disagree), 1 (strongly disagree).14
Given the current and historical strained relationship between the two countries, we expect to find that
many Japanese respondents support the belligerent action and that the baseline approval rate should be high.
However, despite the baseline hawkish attitudes, we also expect that providing trade or arming information
about the relationship between two countries will dampen support for military action and make respondents
less likely to support the belligerent decision, through linking the belligerent action to its potential costs. We
believe Japanese respondents should be able to associate this kind of information about relationships with
costs of hawkish action. For example, in 2012, a diplomatic incident between Japan and China, induced
11The approval rate for the government was slightly lower (41%) in July 2015 than the 2015 average (46%). We will discuss
below whether respondents just approved or opposed the government rather than reacted to our treatments. The information
is based on the monthly polls of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation, see http://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/research/
yoron/political/2015.html.
12Respondents were invited by the company to participate in the survey about international relations. Those who agreed
to participate answered questions on the company’s survey website. The response rate was 5.9%.
13Johns and Davies (2012) use a similar hypothetical sentence.
14As the Japanese government mainly uses coastal guards and do not have stationed military forces to patrol the islands, the
hypothetical decision should be considered a belligerent action.
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by the Japanese government’s hawkish action, led Chinese customers to boycott Japanese products. Bilateral
trade between the two countries dropped by 3.9%, and the national media propagated related news items
for a long time (Japan Times, January 11, 2013). We thus expect that providing information about trade
and arming between the two countries induces respondents to become more aware of costs associated with a
hypothetical military action.
All the respondents received such stimulus information right before the hypothetical scenario was pre-
sented, but the specific information each respondent received varies. Respondents were randomly assigned
to one of four treatment groups. In all the treatment groups, we inserted information about a relationship
between Japan and China (i.e., trade or arming) in the context of the territorial disputes. Because the re-
lationship information alone may not be sufficient to prompt respondents to associate the information with
costs of hawkish action, we also provided information on trends in the relationship (i.e., trends in trade or
arming), thereby facilitating the association. By exposing respondents to such information, the survey exper-
iment was intended to test whether providing information about a relationship with a rivalry (i.e., China)
and triering awareness of likely costs of military conflict enhances or reduces support for the Japanese
government’s aressive action.15
More specifically, based on our above-mentioned argument, the survey experiment was implemented
via two sets of cross-cutting treatments (i.e., 2 × 2 = 4 treatment groups). In the first two treatment groups,
we exposed respondents to either information about the extent of trade interdependence or levels of arming.
We used a similar number of words for both of the information so as to control for a possible framing eect
due to the length of the text. Further, since each script including the stimulus information as well as the
hypothetical scenario consists of three dierent sentences in total, adding a conjunction — e.g., therefore,
despite, and however — between the sentences may mislead some respondents to answer in a certain way. To
avoid this, we presented the three sentences without any conjunction.16 The specific information content and
15An alternative experimental design could be to try to make individuals directly assess costs of military action. However,
a major downside is that it would be difficult to elicit truthful answers from respondents. If the connection is too obvious
and direct, they may try answer in a way that believe to be desired rather than based on actual preferences. Thus, we see our
approach to provide information about trade ties or arming in order to trigger perception of likely costs of military action as
more appropriate.
16We thank (anonymous) for the suggestion. Although Berinsky and Kinder (2006) propose that providing information
in a context of a good story helps people understand complex issues, we believe that since our study deals with a much simpler
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wordings follow our previous study (anonymous). For example, the respondents in the arming treatment saw
the following sentences: “China is a potential military threat to Japan, and Japan is also a potential military
threat to China. Both China and Japan have dramatically increased the amount of military expenditures
since 2008. Today, the Japanese government decided to station SDF (Self-Defense Forces) destroyers on the
Senkaku islands.”
The respondents in the trade interdependence treatment saw the followings: “China is the top trad-
ing partner of Japan, and Japan is also the top trading partner of China. Both China and Japan have
dramatically increased the quantity of exports and imports to each other since 2008. Today, the Japanese
government decided to station SDF (Self-Defense Forces) destroyers on the Senkaku islands.”
To be precise, each treatment group was presented with two dierent types of information: one about the
relationship between Japan and China in terms of either military expenditure or trade interdependence,
and another about the trends in the relationship. Thus, any change in respondents’ attitudes due to a
treatment can be attributed to either the relationship information eect or the trend information eect. Yet,
Tanaka, Tago and Gleditsch (2017) find no evidence that highlighting trends in interdependence between
two countries has a greater eect on individual attitudes than levels. Accordingly, we assume that the latter
trend information does not aect the respondents’ perception directly, but rather helps respondents process
the information of relationship between Japan and China.
It is also important to note that the information we provided in both trade and arming does not directly
mention costs associated with the military action. In the trade treatments, by providing information about
significant amount of trade between Japan and China, we suest that the hypothetical military action is
likely to disrupt the trade relationship and result in large economic opportunity costs. Similarly, in the
arming treatments, by providing information about the intensity of military rivalry between Japan and
China, we suest that the military action by the government is likely to lead to more severe militarized
conflicts between the two countries and result in large conflict-related costs. In this sense, the military
expenditure, or budgetary costs, per se in the experimental scenario is not the costs we intend to test; rather,
the military expenditure is a way to raise people’s awareness of potential costs associated with subsequent
subject, the sentences without a conjunction lead to relatively neutral framing as well.
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military action.
In terms of our theoretical expectations, we expect that trade interdependence increases individual
awareness about greater opportunity costs, and make respondents more likely to oppose hostile actions. Sim-
ilarly, we expect that despite the current hostile relationship between the two countries and existence of
actual external threats, the arming information will dampen hawkish attitudes due to concerns about
likely costs derived from a possible militarized conflict and subsequent economic recession, and respondents
are more likely to oppose the government action. However, since arming may be perceived to be more costly
than loss of trade, we expect that the pacifying eect of arming is higher than the impact of trade.
Further, to test the implications of our main claim, we emphasize the information provided in the trade
and arming treatments, and expose some respondents to a graphical image that illustrates the trends in the
relationship, i.e., either military expenditures or trade interdependence. In order to identify the added
eect of visual information, the respondents in the graphical image treatment groups also get the same text
information as well. Figure 1 shows the example of the graphs – the le panel illustrates an increasing
trend in military expenditure of Japan and China, and the right panel shows an increasing trend in trade
interdependence between the two countries. To control for other factors in graphs, we used the same graphs
for both panels, and only the texts in the graphs dier (e.g., “amount of military expenditure” and “amount
of trade” on the Y-axis).17
17The number of the trade graph reflects actual information of trade interdependence between Japan and China, while the
number of the defense graph is not based on actual military expenditure information. However, it is still a fact that the military
expenditure in both countries has increased over time, and the graph clearly conveys an arms race between Japan and China.
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Figure 1: Figure Treatments
(a) Defense Figure (b) Trade Figure
Since respondents already received the relationship and trend information in text, the graph may not
contain much additional information – the graph conveys the same information as the first and second
sentences above.18 However, following the literature, we believe that a graph in combination with a text
boosts the impact of the textual information. Thus, our theoretical expectations have the same direction as
the text only treatment, but we expect larger eects for the graphical treatments. Note that our goal here is
not to test whether particular types of visual presentations lead to dierent eects on people’s attitudes; rather,
drawing on Nyhan and Reifler (2016) and Piston (2014), we aim to examine the implications of our central
claim – whether greater awareness of costs associated with military action via a graphical presentation is
more likely to increase the opposition to the action.
In sum, with the 2× 2 cross-cutting treatments, we have four dierent treatments in total and randomly
assigned one of the treatments to the sample. Table 1 shows the list of the treatment groups. Table A in
the Appendix confirms that randomization has succeeded in generating balanced treatment groups across
relevant demographic indicators of age, gender, education level and income level. Given previous the findings
of previous studies that information about economic interdependence reduces support for military action
(Tanaka, Tago and Gleditsch 2017) – consistent with H0 –, we consider the text only treatment about trade
18To be precise, the graph provides more information such as the exact numbers of trade amount and military expenditure,
thereby reducing respondents’ uncertainty over the information. But we believe that this still is consistent with our expectation
that increased awareness of military costs (partly due to the reduced uncertainty) increase opposition for military action.
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(i.e., T4) as our reference group.
Table 1: Summary of treatment groups
Group Defense Trade Figure
T1: Defense (figure) X X
T2: Defense (text) X
T3: Trade (figure) X X
T4: Trade (text) X
Covariates
In addition to the experimental treatment, the survey also includes basic demographic questions includ-
ing key individual covariates such as age, education, income level, and political affiliations. In particular,
scholars find that partisanship influences how (visual) information aects public opinion about interna-
tional conflicts (Caverley and Krupnikov 2015, Gartner 2011). To examine the possibility that the eect of
information diers by sub-population, the following analyses also use the political affiliation variable and
include an interaction term between a treatment and the variable in some of the specifications.
Results: Treatment Effects
Before we conduct t-tests, we first simply compare mean approval rates by our four treatment
groups. Figure 2 indicates that the Defense (figure) treatment (T1) has the most pacifying eect
(µT1 = 3.92, SDT1 = 1.32, NT1 = 354). The Defense (text) treatment has the second most
pacifying eect (µT2 = 4.08, SDT2 = 1.23, NT2 = 324), while the treatment in the Trade
(figure) group has a similar eect (µT3 = 4.10, SDT3 = 1.25, NT3 = 323). Finally, our ref-
erence group, the Trade (text) treatment, has the smallest pacifying eect on respondents’ attitudes
(µT4 = 4.18, SDT4 = 1.28, NT4 = 290). Three key findings emerge from this initial exploration. First,
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the results show that trade information (text only) has the smallest pacifying eect on people’s attitude,
and that the other three treatments have larger pacifying eects relative to the reference group. Second,
the defense treatments generally have larger pacifying eects than the trade treatments. Finally, the
results show that graph presentations combined with text presentations have larger pacifying impacts on
attitudes than text alone.19 We note that as expected, given the current strained relationship between the
two countries, the mean approval rates across the four groups are relatively high (i.e., between 3.92 and
4.18). Because we use the 5-point scale dependent variable, the pacifying eects we find here would be
more gradual and unlikely to fundamentally overturn an individual respondent’s opinion, for example,
switching from support to opposition.
Figure 2: Mean Approval Rates by Treatment Groups
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Note: The dot shows a treatment effect and the bars indicates the standard errors of the means.
To examine the initial exploration more formally, we now conduct a t-test comparing sets of treatment
groups. First, we find that regardless of how the information is presented (figure vs. text), defense treatments
have larger pacifying eects than the trade treatments. This is statistically significant at the 10% level
(t = 1.89, N = 1, 291). Second, as Figure 2 suests, compared to any of the trade treatments (either
figure or text), the Defense (figure) treatment has a statistically significant pacifying eect on people’s attitude
19Some may wonder if the pacifying effect of the military expenditure treatment (figure) stems from Japanese military
expenditure seemingly exceeding those of China in the figure, thus dampening public support for belligerent action. However,
the fact that the direction of the effect can be observed even with the text only treatment as well as the trade treatments (both
figure and text only) does not support this interpretation.
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and it increases the opposition level for the government hostile action toward China (t = 1.74, N = 677;
and t = 2.45, N = 644, respectively). Finally, we find that the treatment groups with a graphical
presentation sees lager pacifying eects on people’s attitudes than text only, and the dierence between the
groups is statistically significant at the 10% level (t = 1.71, N = 1, 289). However, comparing the
Defense (figure) treatment with the Defense (text) treatment is just below statistically significance at the
10% level (t = 1.63, N = 678), suesting that the eect of images is at best weakly positive for the
military expenditure information. The dierence between the Trade (figure) treatment with the Trade
(text) treatment was not statistically significant (t = 0.78, N = 613).
To summarize our main findings so far, we find that (1) arming information can dampen public’s
hawkish attitudes more than trade information; and (2) graphical presentation can generally increase the
pacifying eect of information on people’s attitudes. The finding suests that citizens can become more
dovish once they are more aware of costs associated with military action.20
Mechanisms
Consistent with our claims, the evidence in combination with previous studies so far indicates that
providing information about a bilateral relationship can dampen people’s hawkish attitudes within the
context of territorial disputes with a rivalry state. Yet, we still need to confirm whether the results are based
on the expected mechanisms we laid out in the theoretical section. To specify why such bilateral information
has a pacifying eect, we asked the respondents several follow-up questions about why they opposed the
government’s hostile decision. The number of relevant respondents is 139 for the Defense (figure) group, 103
for the Defense (text) group, 115 for Trade (figure) group, and 86 for the Trade (text) group, respectively.
First, we asked the respondents who opposed the decision whether they were afraid of possible disruption
20The awareness of political costs may also be exacerbated by so-called “negativity bias.” As a variety of psychological studies
shows, human beings have a tendency to pay more attention to negative information (e.g., Baumeister, Finkenauer and Vohs
2001, Rozin and Royzman 2001). This is also true for political informational processing (e.g., Soroka 2014). In our case,
information about whether and how much one has to pay costs is naturally negative, and we expect that the information
about the costs of conflicts – both arming and trade – further contributes to a decline in individual support for hawkish
action by the government. Future research is needed to isolate people’s opposition to costs of conflicts from such negativity
bias.
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of the economic relationship between Japan and China (1: Yes; 0: No). The le panel in Figure 3 summarizes
the mean opposition rates. Although the graphical treatments (both defense and trade) seem to activate
more concern about possible economic costs than the text alone treatments, the figure shows that regardless
of the treatment group, about 40% of the respondents told that they opposed the decision due to the possible
economic disruption. This suests that bilateral relationship information (at least about arming and trade
interdependence) is generally associated with individuals concerns about possible economic opportunity costs
due to the government’s belligerent action.
Figure 3: Reason for opposing military action
(a) Economic cost
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(b) Cost of adversity
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[Note: We also report the number of observations and standard errors for each bar.]
Next, we asked the same respondents whether they opposed the decision because they were afraid of
increased hostility between Japan and China (1: Yes; 0: No).21 The right panel of Figure 3 replicates the
le panel of Figure 3. According to the figure, we first find that the respondents in all the treatment groups
were generally more concerned about increased hostility between Japan and China than about economic
disruption. For example, even in the least pacifying treatment (i.e., Trade (text)), 18.6% more people opposed
the government’s decision due to this reason, compared to the economic reason (40.7%→ 59.3%). This may
21We deliberately chose a less severe outcome/concern here rather than more dramatic outcomes such as militarized con-
flicts, because we believe there will be more heterogeneity exists in terms of respondents’ opinion about the likelihood of severe
outcomes such as military confrontation.
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not be surprising because the government decision itself is already hostile, and it is natural for respondents
to think that it would increase animosity between Japan and China.
But more importantly, the figure shows that the individual responses exactly mirror the opposition rates
in Figure 2 – e.g., respondents in the defense (figure) treatment are the most likely to oppose the government’s
military action and they are the ones who are most concerned with increased adversity due to the military
action. We interpret this as evidence that respondents are more likely to oppose military actions because
they perceive more costs associated with the military actions and are concerned with increase adversity due
to the military action. Although most of the treatment groups are not statistically significant from each
other in each panel of Figure 3 (except a pair of Defense (figure) and Trade (text) in the right panel), the
following two points are consistent with our interpretation. First, the defense treatments (both text and
figure) cultivates more fear for increased adversity between Japan and China than the trade treatments,
partly because in addition to fears of economic disruption, the arming information fuels more concern over
possible military costs of the government’s hostile action. Second, the figure shows that the graphical image
treatments generally trier more concern for increased adversity between Japan and China than the text
treatments (this pattern can be seen in the right panel in Figure 3). This suests that graphical presentation
increases individual awareness about information (Moreno and Mayer 2002, Mayer 2009), and thus helps
people think about possible costs of military action and thus in turn increase opposition for the government’s
hawkish action.
Political Affiliation and Cost Perception
Finally, while our main analysis oers support for our argument, we further explore an auxiliary
argument, namely that approval and opposition for the government decision depends on the respondents’
party affiliation. From this perspective, the likelihood of approval or opposition for the belligerent action can
be intensified by an approval or opposition to the current Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government. To
consider this possibility, we estimate a model with an interaction between the experimental treatments and
a reported LDP affiliation variable.
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Figure 4 shows the regression result with a comparison between the defense (figure) and trade (text)
treatments, which are the most and least pacifying treatments, respectively. First, the figure indeed suests
that the treatment eect of the defense (figure) varies by the characteristics of respondents. In terms of politi-
cal affiliation, LDP supporters are more likely to support the government’s hostile decision, and this eect is
statistically significant at the 1% level. By contrast, supporters for the main opposition party (i.e., Democratic
Party of Japan or DPJ) are less likely to support the decision. This confirms that political affiliation aects
the support level of government policies.22 However, more importantly, despite the significant eect of party
affiliation, the pacifying eect of the treatment (here, defense (figure)) still remains significant. Even aer
controlling for political affiliation, providing arming information still has a pacifying eect on individual
attitudes. This suests that even the LDP supporters can be influenced by the cost information and be less
likely to support the belligerent action (note that there is no interaction eect between the treatment and
LDP variables).
Figure 4: Interaction Effects with Political Affiliation: Defense (figure) vs. Trade (text)
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Note: The dot shows a treatment effect and the bars indicated 90% confidence intervals.
22Further, we find that male respondents and those with higher income are also more likely to support the decision.
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Conclusion
Despite a large number of studies of the eect of external threats, we have few systematic investigations
of how individual awareness about likely military and economic costs mediates the relationship between
threats and support for military action. We have argued that individuals who perceive greater costs of
military action are less likely to support a leader’s belligerent action, in ways that mitigate the rally eect
of external threats, while those who do not should be more likely to support the leader’s hawkish position
in a situation with plausible threat.
Using a survey experiment in Japan on the ongoing territorial disputes with China, we examined em-
pirical implications of the argument. Despite the high salience of the issue, the survey experiment revealed
that Japanese respondents responded to information about trade ties or arming between Japan and China,
and became less likely to support the government’s hawkish foreign policy. We also found that providing
the same information using a graphical image strengthens the pacifying eect of the information. Further
analyses showed that individuals who received the information are indeed concerned with possible economic
and military costs of the government’s hawkish action, thereby leading to their opposition to the action.
The findings have two key implications. First, even with the presence of external threat from a rival state,
public opinion can constrain hawkish leaders when people are aware of possible costs of hawkish action, even
if leaders themselves are not deterred. Second, our results suest that the substantive eect of information
about levels of arming is stronger than the eects of information about economic interdependence. This
indicates that it may be possible to reduce the likelihood of international conflict simply by making people
recognize cost of war with arms race information, although this should be carefully assessed with similar
experiments in other countries.
In particular, our experiment was conducted in Japan, where the current constitution formally re-
nounces the sovereign right of belligerency and prohibits the possession of “formal” military forces, and a
recent poll suests that about a half of the population still prefer to maintain the “pacifist” constitution
(Asahi Shinbun, May 1, 2018). Thus, the Japanese may be more easily scared by arming information than
other nations. For instance, in South Korea, where an arms race has been the normal state of relations for
20
decades, people may be less alarmed by cost of war information. We will need further comparable research
to assess whether our findings will generalize to other cases, but we believe that our study provides a useful
theoretical and empirical foundation for such future comparative research.
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Appendix
Table A: Balance Test
Defense Trade Defense Trade F-test
(text) (text) (figure) (figure) (p-value)
Age 45.63 45.17 44.57 45.27 0.752
Gender 0.46 0.47 0.52 0.48 0.467
College Education 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.55 0.198
Income 2.96 3.07 2.88 3.00 0.399
Observation 355 333 396 376
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